Barrier derivatives are the most liquid among the over-the-counter derivatives. Over-the-counter markets have become stronger and stronger in the industry. 1 European, continuously-monitored barrier options are European options with an American feature. Option's existence depends on whether the underlying price breaches, before or at maturity, some prespecified levels, called barriers. Given one barrier, single knockin options come to life and single knockouts expire if the barrier is hit. Given two barriers, the double barrier corridor encompasses the initial underlying price.
Double knockins come to life and double knockouts expire if either barrier is hit. A portfolio of a knockin and a knockout written on the same barriers and strike is equivalent to a vanilla option with the same strike. Thus, one can focus on knockins only.
Barrier options are very popular because they are cheaper than their vanilla counterparts. This endears them to hedge funds, which thrive on achieving the biggest bang for their buck. 2 Via double barriers, investors enjoy even greater leverage potential: Single knockouts typically have barriers too close for comfort and single knockins have less knockin chances without much discount. A double knockin may be bought by a fund manager who bets against market consensus' direction but hedges her bet for marking-to-market purposes. It may also be bought by a trader who foresees a bigger volatility than the market consensus' one in both bullish and bearish scenarios. The following numerical example shows the structure of those hedging layers. The current underlying price is $90. Consider a double knockin call with lower barrier $80 and upper barrier $100. Its strike is $90. The double knockin call 3 is priced $12.8079. The double knockin price is mainly made of the $100-in price ($12.7587) as the logprice drift is positive and the probability of reaching the $100 level first is high. The following table shows barriers, strikes, portfolio amounts, 1 Dupont (2001) documents that, as of December 1999, over-the-counter transactions accounted for around 86 percent ($88 trillion) of the total notional value of derivatives contracts, exchanges for about 14 percent ($14 trillion).
2 This generates problems because hedge fund managers have a strong incentive to drive the underlying market towards their long knockin barriers. From The Economist, London, March 18, 1995; Anonymous.
... A fierce battle between a buyer and seller of knock-in options. In late 1994 ..., Merrill Lynch, ..., and a fund managed on behalf of Micheal Steinhardt, a well-known hedge fund manager, slugged it out in the market for Venezuelan Brady bonds (repackaged debt partially backed by American Treasury bonds). The fund owned a knock-in option and was trying to push up prices by buying huge quantities of bonds. Merrill, which had sold the option, used all of its muscle to keep them below the point at which the option would have been triggered. This may explain why trading volumes in this otherwise obscure market soared: ..., at the height of the battle, some $1.5 billion-worth of the almost $7 billion outstanding Venezuelan Brady bonds changed hands, pushing up prices by 10%. 3 Other option parameters are: annualized riskfree rate equal to 5%, logprice annualized volatility equal to 30%, 1-year maturity, and payout rate equal to 0.
portfolio amounts in $s of the single knockin positions that constitute the hedging layers. Barrier Exact Hedge (DBEH ). The first few positions of the DBEH are sufficient to achieve good replication of the double knockin. Rebates associated to barrier options are special cases of them so that the pricing and hedging analysis here developed embraces them.
Contributions
The DBEH contributes along these lines.
(1) It is static. (2) It exhibits an automaticallyin feature along the barriers, because it has barrier-like nature as its target contract, the double knockin. (3) It takes account of the drift towards either barrier generated by a non-trivial cost of carrying the underlying asset. (4) It establishes an explicit link between single barrier pricing and double barrier pricing. Tests of hedging performance, carried out in Section 3., suggest that (1) and (2) are the most relevant for practical purposes. Bowie and Carr (1994) and Derman, Ergener, and Kani (1994) . Dupont (2001) Andersen, Andreasen, and Eliezer (2000) handles general price-dependent volatility but needs an along-all-strikes continuum of European options and an along-all-maturities continuum of calendar spreads. I show that the cost-of-carry effect is not massive even for low levels of logprice volatility.
Single barrier option prices are well known (see Merton (1973) , Cox and Rubinstein (1985) , Benson and Daniel (1991) , Hudson (1991) , Reiner and Rubinstein (1991) , Heynen and Kat (1994) , Rich (1994), and Trippi (1994) ). However, double barrier pricing is difficult because of the double barrier interdependence. The mathematics which unravels that interdependence is awkward, so that existing closed-form prices (Douady (1999) , Hui (1996) , Hui, Lo, and Yuen (2000) , Kunitomo and Ikeda (1992) , Lin (1997 ), Pelsser (2000 ) achieve elegance at the expenses of financial intuition.
The DBEH states that the double barrier option price is a weighted sum of single barrier option prices with weights which do not depend on the initial underlying price. Geman and Yor (1996) and Jamshidian (1997) 
The Double Barrier Exact Hedge (DBEH)
Here I show that, under the Black-Scholes assumptions, the double barrier option price is a weighted sum of single barrier option prices. Such pricing results cast light on the financial nature of the contract. The key feature is that they project the risk of double barrier instruments on to single barrier instruments. 
is a call option which is initiated whenever either the upper barrier U or the lower barrier L is touched before or at option maturity. The instantaneous return rate of the riskfree asset is the constant r and the underlying asset offers a constant instantaneous payout rate d. C (S 0 , K, T ) denotes the standard call price.
The DBEH unravels the pricing and hedging difficulty of double barrier options in a way which makes it easily comparable with the existing double barrier option literature, in particular with the double barrier option decomposition of Carr, Ellis and Gupta (1998) .
Proposition 1 Under the Black-Scholes assumptions, the double knockin call price has the following exact decomposition:
where the constant σ is the local volatility of the underlying logprice. The portfolio-weight factors are Proof. See the appendix.
Notice that Part II of LFUI dominates in absolute value part I of UFLI. They have the same portfolio amounts, same strikes, but LFUI has higher down-in barriers than UFLI. On the other hand, Part I of LFUI is dominated in absolute value by Part II of UFLI. They have the same portfolio amounts, same strikes, but UFLI has lower up-in barriers than LFUI. Given that the original strike is within the double barrier corridor, Part II of UFLI actually consists of vanilla call options because its up-in barriers are lower than their corresponding strikes. Table I U L −1 would be the risk-adjusted probability of the price ever travelling from L to U and in the opposite direction if the risk-adjusted price had zero local drift. Zero local drift for the underlying asset implies zero cost of carry and this is a natural assumption only for forwards).
Proposition 2 Under the Black-Scholes assumptions and with zero cost of carry, the static hedge
proposed by CEG and the DBEH coincide in every respect.
Proof. See the appendix. Table II illustrates the equivalence between the two hedges in the case of zero carrying costs. σ is the local volatility of the underlying logprice. r, d, and σ are constant.
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action happens at the lower barrier. Along there, for high logprice volatility levels (50%), the U -in call makes the Basic Portfolio nearly 100% exceed the vanilla call value. The value of UFLI (Parts I and II) eliminates the unwanted value along the upper barrier.
Indeed, UFLI is a short position in a L-in call that becomes available as soon as the upper barrier U is hit first before or at maturity, with today's value
E Q denotes expectation under the risk-adjusted probability measure and T U (T L ) is the first time the underlying price reaches the upper barrier U (L). If the lower barrier is hit first, the indicator function calculated on the event T U < T L is zero so that there is zero unwanted contribution there.
The value of LFUI (Parts I and II) offsets the unwanted value along the lower barrier. Indeed, LFUI is a short position in a U -in call that becomes available as soon as the lower barrier L is hit first before or at maturity, with today's value
If the upper barrier is hit first, the indicator function calculated on the event T L < T U is zero so that there is zero unwanted contribution there.
CEG, pp. 1174-1176, describe step by step how this architecture works. Consider the replication of the $80 / $100 double barrier knockin call. One must zero out unwanted value along each barrier. The size of that error decreases to zero with the number of hedging layers added.
The Cost-Of-Carry Effect and The Barrier Effect
How important is keeping track of a drift towards either barrier generated by a non-zero cost of carry of the underlying asset? An answer is the evaluation, along both barriers, of the part of the replicating portfolio proposed by CEG which is meant to be zero over there if the carrying cost had been zero. In Figure 2 , the cost of carry is 3% and the relevant barrier is supposed to have been just hit so that the value of a vanilla call is taken away from both CEG and DBEH values.
The CEG and DBEH portfolios consider the first 2 layers of their series-like elements in addition to a non-barrier Basic Portfolio replica and the Basic Portfolio itself respectively. This means that the series terms with n = 1 and n = 2 in Tables I and II are considered. These are the knockin positions involved by the DBEH. Figure 2 shows that CEG is substantially off zero (its value is falling 50% short of the vanilla call price) only along $80 and for quite low logprice volatility levels (10%). However, Figure 1 makes clear that, at such volatility levels, there is no vanilla price action at all. ( 100 80 ) −1 . In both cases, the maximum difference does not fade out to zero as volatility picks up. However, such volatility effect on DBEH portfolio amounts becomes irrelevant when one looks at the portfolio amounts in $s. Fixing the portfolioamount volatility does not affect height and shape of the DBEH graphs in Figures 2, 3 , and 4.
Even fixing two different portfolio-amount volatility levels in UFLI and LFUI (to accomodate some volatility smirk, for example) is basically neutral. Thus, DBEH graphs take portfolio amounts calculated at varying volatility levels within the range [10%, 50%], but they well represent also a volatility-static DBEH strategy where the replicating agent fixes portfolio amounts according to her best guess about the along-the-barriers volatility scenarios.
The hedger can project the risk of barrier instruments, and in particular of double barrier ones, on to simple European options. This means that, as soon as either barrier is hit, 'manual' unwinding of the hedge must take place. This exposes barrier option hedgers to underlying market price manipulation and spurious volatility. This can be the case if the counterpart of the barrier option hedger is a hedge fund. Hedge funds typically use the cheapest means to place big, one-way bets. The temptation to nudge prices can be hard to resist if the result will make a big difference to hedge funds' performance, and hence to the fees their managers earn.
Hence originates Taleb's (1998) 
risk management hint: avoid hedging discontinuous exposures (barrier instruments) with continuous ones (non-barrier instruments). I show that, along the lower barrier, this hint should be taken with a pinch of salt.
In showing this, I focus on barrier breaching that occurs 3 months before options expiration but the results are quite the same across other possible hitting times. Figure 1 points out that much of the unwanted value is contributed by the $100-in along $80. In order to exactly offset this, Part II of LFUI generates the necessary negative value. Unfortunately, such value is steeply downward-sloped value (see Figure 4) . Above $80, additional knockin positions have up-in barriers substancially higher than $100 and they command insignificant value. Below $80, Part II of LFUI is made of short positions and dominates Part I of UFLI as, by construction, its down-in barriers are closer to $80. The underlying price is in that area so that DBEH residual value is quite unstable at any volatility level.
Intuition suggests that CEG and DBEH should be equivalent not only in value but also in terms of sensitivity to option parameters. Indeed, DBEH specializes to CEG when the cost of carry is zero and the cost-of-carry effect is overwhelmed by the volatility effect. By looking at the surfaces in Figure 3 , one can gauge the key sensitivities of the corresponding CEG and DBEH elements, those with respect to the underlying price (delta and gamma) and the one with respect to logprice volatility (vega). Actual equivalence between CEG and DBEH is evident. Figure 2 , the very small and stable value that CEG has around $80 for high volatility levels comes from the fact that CEG substitutes the $80-in call with a non-barrier replica. At $80, as the $80-in call becomes the desired vanilla call, one would have a residual replicating portfolio with value worringly sensitive to small underlying price changes. Since a non-barrier replica of the $80-in call remains in the portfolio if not manually unwound, the difference between the replicating portfolio and a vanilla call includes such remaining value and is flattened out to zero in a comfortably large area around the lower barrier $80 for high volatility levels. Around the lower barrier, high volatility typically captures the jittery market scenario generated by a bearish sentiment and fear of possible price manipulation.
Thus, in
From this analysis, one may milk out a static replicating strategy that optimally mixes CEG and DBEH. The following table summarizes such a mix. This has been written under the assumption that, outside the double barrier corridor, investors prefer the single barrier exotic instrument to its static non-barrier replica when the latter is made of more than 1 piece. CEG replaces LFUI components with 3-piece replicas. Part II of UFLI already has non-barrier nature as its up-in barriers are lower than its call strikes.
Concluding Remarks
Barrier derivatives are becoming increasingly liquid. Double barrier options provide investors and risk managers with cheaper means to place bets and to hedge their exposures respectively without paying for the price ranges which they believe unlikely to occur. Double barrier options stipulate a double barrier price corridor which encompasses the initial level of the underlying asset price and the options are triggered or terminated whenever the underlying asset price breaches either barrier for the first time before or at maturity.
The mutual dependence of the two barriers makes these options difficult to price. This work represents their price like a weighted sum of well-known single barrier knockin option prices. The mutual dependence of the two barriers also makes these options difficult to hedge. The pricing representation implies a static hedging strategy (the DBEH).
Double barrier hedges offer full protection only if unwound along the barriers. Along, the DBEH has automatic unwinding. Seller of knockin options may appreciate this if they fear artificial/nonartificial spurious volatility. However, along the lower barrier, tests on hedging performance suggest the substitution of the lower-barrier-in call with a non-barrier replica.
After either barrier is hit, static hedges offer additional benefits with respect to dynamic hedges, especially in high volatility scenarios. This is because static hedge values are very smooth and close to the appropriate level in a wide price range around either barrier.
APPENDIX
The underlying asset has cost of carry equal to r − d (r is the constant riskfree rate and d is the asset's payout rate). Its risk-adjusted logprice, x t = ln St, follows a diffusion process with dynamics:
where Wt is a Standard Brownian Motion and r, d, and σ are time-homogeneous and satisfy the conditions that allow for xt's existence and uniqueness. Set ln
, and a finite time horizon (option's maturity), T .
The probability density of xt's transition from x0 to x during T , p (x 0, x, T ) has time-horizon Laplace transform given by:
Taking time-horizon Laplace transforms simplifies the analysis. The Partial Differential Equation (PDE) dynamics of p (x 0 , x, T ) turns into an Ordinary Differential Equation (ODE) dynamics. A further simplification comes from that the Convolution Property of Laplace transforms applies here. Because of xt's Strong Markov Property, a probability density involving first exit times until the time horizon can be written as a convolution of similar densities stopped at the time horizon. A transformed convolution is the product of the transformed densities involved in the convolution. Proof. The probability density of x t's transition is an Itô process and it can be conceived as a conditional expectation, that is, as a local martingale. Thus, its local drift must be zero, which means that the expectation, conditional on x0, of p's infinitesimal changes is null, E (dp | x0) = 0. This is p's backward equation and one gets the Laplace ODE by taking time-horizon Laplace transforms in it. L is positive because p is non-negative in all its arguments and it is unique because of Laplace transforms' uniqueness.
Proposition 3 The time-horizon Laplace transform L(λ, x0, x) satisfies the ODE
The moment generating function of xt's first exit time through some barrier b,
is related to the Laplace transform of the probability density of xt's transition from x0 to b as well as that of the probability density of x t 's transition from b to the same level b. 
The solution to the Laplace ODE is given by
The 
For any λ > 0 and x0 
+ satisfies the Laplace ODE and meets m + 's two initial conditions. The same preliminary decomposition can be obtained from Jamshidian's (1997) analysis by expanding
in power series. The Arithmetic Brownian Motion hypothesis yields
The Arithmetic Brownian Motion hypothesis implies that the travel distance b − , b + can be shifted by any shifting factor ±c. Set c equal to either n b
Then, 'Strong Markov Up' and 'Strong Markov Down' lead to 'm + 's form''s actual form.
Proof of Proposition 1
The probability density which prices the double knockin contracts has the following option-maturity Laplace transform:
Proposition 5 as well as option prices' homogeneity of degree 1 in the initial price, the strike, and the possible barriers, can be used. This gives the DBEH result and completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2
The Put Call Symmetry (PCS) states that, under the Black-Scholes assumptions with zero risk-adjusted drift of the underlying price, the value of an amount 1 √ call strike of calls is equal to the value of an amount 1 √ put strike of puts, if the geometric mean of the call strike and the put strike is the current underlying price:
By means of the PCS, Bowie and Carr (1994) and Carr, Ellis, and Gupta (1998) show that a European single barrier option can be replicated by a portfolio of European standard calls, European standard puts, and European binary options. A European binary call (put) is a cash-or-nothing option which pays $1 if the underlying price is above (below) the strike price, and zero otherwise. In particular, they prove the following results for down-in call options, and up-in call options respectively: asset (repo rate, 6%, minus asset's payout rate, 3%) is 3%. UFLI and LFUI consider the first 2 layers of their series-like terms.
